563 all over the Soviet Union. These communities, recognizable not only for their German names, were naturally very exclusive (this for economic considerations to a large degree), and had preserved many features of 18th century German peasant life. It is improbable that the German communities exist today.

Multanis

778 177 On the peninsula of Apsheron, near Surakhany, 20 km. east of Baku, a small old fire temple is found, in the midst of a pentagon which once was a kind of monastery for the fire worshippers. This pentagon, with a little square grey temple, is usually called Ātashgāh ("Place of the Fire"), as the Persians designate the Zoroastrian sanctuaries. All around this Atashgah, the oil derricks rise to the sky, in the midst of surface piping and oil puddles. During the 18th century and the first half of the 19th, the Atashgah was a much-visited goal of pilgrims from western India, which for a long time—at least from the 16th century on—had maintained very close commercial relations with Azerbaidjan. Thus, the Parsis seem to have rediscovered the Sacred Spot where the Holy Fire leaps forth from the earth, as had been known from times immemorial. Hence the name Azerbaidjan, meaning in Pahlavi (in the form of Ādar-baθgān) "The home of the fire"; hence the erection of the little temple in which the Holy Flame could be venerated. Not long

778 after the oil industry had begun to exploit the
177 wells of Apsheron, natural gas was also made use of, with the result that after 1887, the regular religious services at the temple were discontinued. Above the entrance to the fire temple there is a Sanskrit inscription set into the wall, although upside down; however, the inscription does not contain any data as to the erection of the temple or of the particular place in India with which it was intimately connected.
101 The fire worshippers of Surakhany were called
177 Multani, and though no literary sources on this name have come to my attention, this is a hint as to the origin of these fire worshippers, who may have come from the city of Multan on the Chenab, a tributary of the Indus in present-day Pakistan. Evidently, this city was the home of the Parsi founders of that trading colony in or near Baku. These Multānī could hardly be called a national minority in the Caucasus; they are to be considered rather as temporary residents, unlike the Greeks of the ancient Ionian colonies.

Conclusion. Ethnical History

174 Thus, we see the older inhabitants of the Caucasus living in the higher regions of the Great Caucasus and in Dagestan and the southern and southwestern parts of Trans-Caucasia. These peoples have been living in the Caucasus since pre-historic times. In many instances, we can distinguish among them early and more

174 recent layers of population. The older peoples show ancient mate connect on with the south, the plateaus of Anatolia and Iran, and the adjacent plains of Mesopotamia. Somewhat more recent in this Trans Caucasian world are the Iranians and the Armenians, however, they still are old as compared with the Turkic invaders of the recent past, as we must designate the Azerbaidjanians.

A foreign conquest in this region does not always result in the retreat or pushing back of the indigenous peoples into the high mountains. As a consequence of the Russian conquest, one hundred years ago, some of the Caucasian mountain peoples were forced, in varying proportions, to leave the mountains and descend into the lower valleys of their rivers, or even into the adjacent North Caucasian plains, and to become agricultural settlers. This was not easy,, and was done in response to both persuasion and coercion. Finally, the majority of the Oset'i, a great number of the Chechen and Ingushes (the latter always much feared by the Russians), and last but not least, the Cherkess and Kabarda who did not emigrate, became peaceful peasants also. This was the only way in which the Tsarist government could stop the incessant guerrilla warfare in the mountains and the resistance of the Caucasians, which had continued even after the defeat of Shamil in 1859, in the form of continual robberies, and attacks on peasants, transports, or

177 even military convoys. By diverting these people to agriculture, order was finally established, resistance on any sort of wide or dangerous level was broken, thus the conditions for the ultimate incorporation of those national groups into the large Russian family were created.

167 174 Since Caucasian studies are still very much in an incipient stage, it is not possible to trace the different waves in which the historical and present-day Caucasian peoples came to their habitats. Where historical sources are missing, the chief help comes from linguistics.

The Eastern Slavs, coming from the north, were the last wave of immigrants and conquerors (18th to 20th centuries). They were preceded by the Turkic-speaking peoples (11th-14th centuries), who in turn came later than the Alanoi-Aorsoi, the forebears of the Oset'i (1st-3rd centuries A. D.). Events prior to that time are unclear. It is impossible to say whether groups of the Skythai, or Sauromatai (6th-1st centuries B. C.) went to the Caucasus, though this might be indicated by a remark of Strabon's (Book XI. chapter 3). And with this, we are in pre-Christian times.

In the south, history goes much farther back, but only insofar as it deals with one of the ancient Semitic or Anatolian (Hittite, etc.) cultures. Therefore, there are enormous gaps for the Caucasus proper, and the peoples who migrated there from the south. The campaigns of Alexander the Great bypassed the Caucasus,

C. G. 301 In Chechnia and N. W. Dagestan head orna-
ments are found consisting of a band on top of
the head with a concatenation of large metal
or glass rings hanging down from it on both
C. G. 302 sides. As to the hairdo, the Georgian women
have the hair hanging down loose over the
back and shoulders or in braids around the
head. Only on the Black Sea coast do they
wear it hanging down in long braids. This is
also the usual way in the Northern Caucasus.
The Tushgris wear the hair in four braids,
which are cut off when they marry; the latter
custom occurs also sporadically in Dagestan.

C. G. 291 177 It must be emphasized that the trad-
itional costume has in most cases partly or
wholly given way to the general European type
of dress, and is worn only on holidays and
special occasions such as weddings and other
celebrations.

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FOLK RELIGION

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The major religions in the Caucasus are Christianity (Georgians except Adzhar and Ingilo; Armenians except Hemshily; Ossetes except Digor; Udi) and Islam (all the rest, except the Mountain Jews and Yezid). But many traces of the older pagan religious view remain. Among the mountaineers in the N. W. Caucasus Islam was introduced comparatively recently (seventeenth century), and in many cases reached only the upper classes. In Dagestan, with its stronger Islamic tradition, the ancient beliefs have disappeared to a much larger extent. In Georgia, Christianity has absorbed many pagan features, and among the Kartvelian mountaineers it was rather paganism that adopted certain outward characteristics of Christianity. In the N. W. Caucasus, the pre-Islamic pagan religion preserved curious vestiges of Christianity which had been introduced from Georgia in the time of queen Tamar, and perhaps even earlier. Here and there in the Caucasus there are remains of the influence of Zoroastrianism.

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The old Caucasian religion was closely connected with family and sib organization. It centered around the house-hearth, above which hung the cooking pot, suspended from an iron chain (Georg. sak'ide(be)li), which had a symbolic value and was believed to be endowed with supernatural powers. It could not

THE RELIGION OF THE OSSETS

C. O. 771 137

The majority of the Ossets profess the orthodox Christian religion. Only a small minority, the Digors, in the western part of the country, are Mohammedans. However, both religions appear mixed to a large extent with old pagan conceptions, rites and customs. The Christians know the names of Christ (Digor Kiriste, Iran Tshysysti), the "Mother Mary" and some of the Christian saints; they go to church and observe certain Christian rites, holidays and fasts; but at the same time they worship and pray to their pagan gods and spirits, sacrificing oxen, goats and sheep, and keep their old pagan holidays.

In a similar way the Mohammedans have a very superficial connection with the Mohammedan religion. They know the name of the prophet, perform the prescribed ablutions, keep Friday as a holiday and Ramazan, the month of fasting. However, like the Christians, they also worship their old pagan gods and celebrate their own traditional festivals.

C. O. 776

Both Christian and Mohammedan Ossets believe in the existence of a high God, an invisible Supreme Being, ruling the world from heaven. His name is Khutsau, and he is often called "the God of the Gods." But the Ossets have only a very vague idea of his nature. They are primarily devoted to the cult of deities which are closer to their hearts and to their

C. O. 796 hearth-fire, and the master of the house recites a long prayer in which he gives thanks to God and asks for blessings for the coming year. During the night the young people go from house to house, throwing corn into the houses, singing and expressing good wishes for prosperity and happiness. At daybreak of New Year's day the master of the house kindles a fire of straw in the courtyard in honor of his deceased parents, who thereby are provided with the necessary fire for the whole year. The day is spent in much merry making, eating and drinking.

C. O. 796 782 776 Only one day, the Wednesday between Christmas and New Year, is dedicated to the worship of an evil spirit, the Devil. The ceremony starts in the evening with the killing of a lamb in front of the door of the house. The spirit is invoked not to do any harm to the cattle and to the other property of the master of the house and to accept an offering of a piece of roasted meat of a lamb and a glass of brandy. During that night one should strictly avoid mentioning the name of the Supreme God, lest the wrath of the evil spirit be provoked. The Devil proper of the Ossets, who is called Khairag is like the well-known figure of the devil of other countries, a good-natured foolish fellow who can easily be duped (der dumme Teufel in German).

C. O. 771 177 This survey* of the most characteristic features of the religion of the Ossets,

* [cf. cat 116, pp 565-574 -- Analyst]

771 their deities, their ways of worship and their
177 festivals, shows clearly that it is a rather sober and primitive pagan religion with a thin surface of a few superficially adopted features of Christianity and Islam. It is most significant, that it is almost entirely devoid of the conception and the worship of God as a Supreme Being, and that only guardian spirits are invoked to grant protection, happiness and prosperity. It is moreover noteworthy that in this religion of tribes of Iranian origin, who have preserved a richly developed Iranian language partly archaic in character, there are to be found scarcely any distinct traits of an older form of Iranian religion. On the other hand, it can be stated that some of the characteristic conceptions of the Ossetic religion are similar to those of the religions of neighboring Caucasian tribes.

An essential part of any religious belief
761 is represented by the conception of death and
775 the fate of the soul in the life to come. We have already mentioned that the soul of the deceased continues its existence as the guardian spirit of its former family. He takes care of the well-being of the family, and according to an old custom, the Ossets twice a year arrange a feast in the woods in honor of the spirit, which is accompanied by the offering of food and drink. They believe that at the time when a
761 person is sick, a tribunal of six men is formed in Heaven to decide whether this person should die. If the decision is in the affirmative, death

773 request, and as soon as the hot body reached the sea, the water began to seethe and dried out completely for two weeks. The water came back after Bertraz had left the sea: he had become steel.

There are many more similar fantastic
773 stories, which extoll the deeds of, and to a
177 large extent mirror the life and way of thinking of the rough-mannered inhabitants of one of the wild rugged mountain regions of the Caucasus. However, it is very uncertain whether those legends of the Narti which have been transmitted in the Ossetic language represent, as has been asserted, the original version and the source of the essentially coincident versions transmitted in some of the non-Iranian languages of the Caucasus. As a matter of fact, neither the names of the heroes nor the character of the stories seem to point to an Iranian origin. (The attempt made by Georges Dumézil in "Légendes sur les Nartes" [Bibliothèque de l'Institut Français de Leningrad, Tome XI] to identify Batraz and another figure of the legends with two figures of the Indo-Iranian mythology is far from convincing.)

There is only one rather loose and obviously not original connection of the cycle of Narti legends with a genuine Iranian motif. It is the figure of the mighty bird Sīmurgh, the Eagle, well-known from the Shāhnāma of the Persian poet Firdousī, which has been attached to the story of the extermination of the Narti.

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After God had destroyed them by fire because of their disobedience and arrogance, the earth was populated by small human beings, and the bird Sīmurgh looks down upon them from his lofty throne which stands on the immeasurably high Mt. Elburz. In one of the most famous episodes of the Persian epic poem, Simurgh's nest on the peak of the Elburz plays an important role.

Even more conspicuous is the Iranian element in certain other stories handed down in non-Iranian languages, such as the two stories presented in German translation by A. Dirr in Kaukasische Märchen, (Jena, 1920, pp. 210ff., No. 58 [in the Udin language], and pp. 219ff. No. 59 [in Tater],) in which we meet the figure of Rustam, the most celebrated hero of the Shāhnāma. It is true that the whole setting of the stories, the kind of deeds performed by the hero and the circumstances under which he acts are largely different from those of the Persian epic, by far more fantastic and often out of all proportion. But the Iranian influence is nevertheless striking. For the two non-Iranian narratives do not have only the name and the supernatural strength of the hero in common with the Persian epic poem. We also find in them a very characteristic and essential feature of the Iranian Rustam legend, i.e. the important part which Sīmurgh, the eagle, plays in the life of the hero. In the Shāhnāma, Rustam's father, Zāl, who had been exposed on Mt. Elburz as a baby, was brought up by Sīmurgh together with his young ones in a nest

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on the top of the mountain. When he had grown up and had to return to his family, the eagle gave him one of his feathers, with the advice to set fire to it in case of imminent danger. Then the eagle would appear at once and bring help. In fact, this need for help arose, when the birth of Rustam caused great difficulties and danger to his mother's life. As soon as his father had kindled the feather, the eagle appeared, foretold the birth of a huge heavy child, a future hero, and declared the necessity of performing a Caesarian operation. Among the instructions for treating the mother's wound, rubbing it with the feather of the eagle is mentioned. The appearance of the eagle immediately after one of his feathers has been set on fire at a time of peril, and the magical healing power of the feather when a wound is rubbed with it, are distinctly reflected in the two stories handed down in non-Iranian languages. It is noteworthy that this motif of the eagle and his magical feather also occurs in a story of an Iranian tribe, the Bakhtiyaris. But it is also found in a passage of the Avesta, the holy stripctures of the Zoroastrians, and it has been previously stated by the present author that this conception played an important part in the ritual of ancient India and is also widespread in the folklore of modern India. (See Bernhard Geiger, Die Amesha Spentas, pp. 73f.)

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The legend of Prometheus also deserves our special attention. It is transmitted in Ossetic and in some of the Caucasian languages.

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from London through Russia, Germany and Holland, to which are added the revolutions of Persia during the present century, with the particular history of the great usurper Nadir Kouli (London, 1753).

(9) **1715—1850.** In this period not only does the ethnographical material begin to increase and reach considerable proportions but the investigations carried out by the authors are scientific in nature. Actual fieldwork is being done. The writers are therefore no longer mere casual travellers but fieldworkers in the strictest sense. Although the method and scholarship of these explorers does not come up to that of modern ethnographers, their works have a special value because they are the products of expeditions prior to the rapid modern acculturation. The first scientific expedition was undertaken by Professor Güldenstadt at the request of the Empress of Russia to penetrate the wild regions of Caucasus, to classify the peoples (her subjects) according to their languages and to study the natural history of the land. The results of Güldenstädt's fieldwork were published in several books, *Beschreibung der kaukasischen Länder* (Berlin, 1834), *Reisen durch Rußland und im kaukasischen Gebirge* (St. Petersburg, 1787), *Reisen nach Georgien und Imerethi* (Berlin, 1815). Soon afterwards some excellent works of travel and some purely scientific works appeared, such as those of Reineggs, Pallas, Steder, Klaproth, Bodenstedt, Dubois de Montpéreux, Longworth, Spencer, Neuman and Wagner.

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(10) **1850—1920.** The Caucasians are still analphabetic except for the Georgians and Armenians, and are unaffected by modern civilization. This is a period of much travel and good field work, e. g., by Radde, Hahn, Erckert, Abercromby, and others. Several large series of periodicals devoted exclusively to the study of the Caucasus are published.[65] Valuable collections of customary laws (*adaty*) made—to mention only *Adaty kavkazskich goreev*, a collection of customary laws which we shall have endless opportunity to cite. In a word this is a productive period.

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(11) **Soviet Caucasus, Caucasology Today.** Considerable progress has been made in the last decades. In linguistics, for example, if we compare Güldenstadt's or Pallas' first attempts with the results attained by Erckert and then if we compare Erckert's achievements with those of the great geniuses like Professor Marr, Prince Trubetskoj and Adolf Dirr, we must say the progress is gratifying. Although Erckert's linguistic contributions contain countless and very serious errors, his work by far surpasses those of Güldenstädt and Pallas, but again compared with modern linguists Erckert is hardly anything more than an untrained amateur. Although the advance made in Caucasian linguistics must be attributed mainly to the work done by the Soviet scholars, such capable linguists as Dirr, Bleichsteiner, Deeters, Dumézil and the contributors to the *Caucasica* must not be overlooked.

Greater progress has been made in prehistory than in any other branch of Caucasology. The activity of the Marr School and Hančar's unparalleled work, *Urgeschichte Kaukasiens* are sufficient evidence of the advance made in this field.

[65] See *infra* pp. 33 f.

595 (1) Custom permits *all* North Caucasians and their neighbours, whether Christian or Mohammedan, to marry more than one wife. The Tartars near the city of Derbend in the eighteenth century are the only exception, but even in this single case, it ist not certain whether they were monogamists *de jure* or only *de facto*.

[177] (2) Everywhere polygyny is *pre-Islamic*, even if previous to their conversion to Islamism the particular tribe happened to be Christian. We might rightly, therefore, inquire into the possible origin of polygyny in the Caucasus. Polygyny, if borrowed at all, was not borrowed as an *isolated* institution. On the contrary, it seems to be a North Caucasian possession, first of all, as old as the practice of levirate (*infra*, pp. 71—75). Furthermore, it seems to be a North Caucasian cultural possession as old as the economic, social, and religious structure of the North Caucasian family itself. Here we understand " family " in its broad sense, including the joint-family and sib. We cannot now describe this family structure in detail. Briefly, by " the economic, social, and religious structure of the family " we understand that the family in North Caucasia has been and in many places still is the *raison d'être* of the individual.[30a] Whatever the individual does or whatever is done to him or for him has only one aim, the perpetuation and prosperity of the family. Now, in the mind of the North Caucasian, polygyny is an immense asset and at times absolutely indispensable for the economic, social, and religious life of the all-important and solely-important family.

593 *Economically* considered, the wife is extremely important. In the North Caucasus it is the wife who does most of the work (*infra*, pp. 156—159). In fact, sometimes a rich Avar will marry a son to a poor girl or to a widow of a lower class, with whom he is forbidden all communication, in order to have an additional worker in the house.[31] Moreover, a wife is not only a *worker* ; she is the " *worker-producing* " organ of the family. Even though boys are preferred (*infra*, pp. 159 ff), girls prove to be good and valuable workers and bring in, at times, a large brideprice (*infra*, pp. 82—91). Now, the more wives there are in the household, the more " worker-producing " organs there are, and by that very fact, at least in the mind of the natives, the family becomes so much the more economically healthy and secure.

The *religious* structure of the family may have contributed just as much to the rise of polygyny as did the economic form of life. The most sacred duty of the individual and of the individual family is, or at least has been, to perpetuate itself, and thus to perpetuate the cult of the ancestors. It is a fact throughout North Caucasus that only a *son* can perpetuate the family and prevent the greatest calamity imagineable, its extinction. But a wife is precisely the " *boy-producing* " organ. If this organ is lacking or fails to function the family is doomed. Today one of the main motives for taking a second wife is sterility.[32] Or again, a second wife will be acquired if the first gives birth only to girls.

[30a] According to ancient customary laws.

[31] L vov, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

[32] Cf. K. Mačavariani, " Někotoryja čerty iz žizni Abchazcev. Položenie ženščiny v Abchazii," SMOMPK, IV (1884), No. 2, p. 42. E. G. Pčelina, " Rodil'nye obyčai u osetin," SE, 1937, No. 4, p. 88

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Chapter V

Means of Acquiring a Wife

§ 1. BY PURCHASE

1. Description of Customary Laws

583 "Bride purchase," as Lowie points out, is a blanket term for various transactions. It fits some cases indeed, but at other times it is a complete misnomer.[1] Such is certainly the case when speaking of the Caucasians. Some tribes actually have a bride *purchase*, while others do not; some may have *had* the custom too but the nature of the payment has so completely changed in the course of years that it is false to speak of a price any longer. In some cases the "bride-price" is nothing more than a symbol; or again it is a mere exchange of gifts, or finally a security for the wife, resembling the *donatio ante nuptias* of the Romans. We shall use the term "bride-price" only in its strict sense. But since a generic term embracing all financial obligations connected with the acquisition of a wife is indispensable, we shall use the native word (*kalym, irad* etc.) or "bride wealth" whenever such a general expression is needed.

[77] The NORTHWESTERN CAUCASIANS. Since the Cherkess have been subject to a rather unusually rapid acculturation in the past 150 years, it is not surprising that the bride-price of old should in the course of decades have taken on many new features. Instead of presenting a complicated historical description of the Cherkess bride-price from its beginning to its disappearance, [illegible] be much better, I think, if we borrow and sum up Ladyženskij's conclusions: (1) Up to the end of the nineteenth century the bride was actually sold (p. [illegible]) and consequently regarded as a chattel. (2) Islamic law improved her position, in so far as a considerable portion of the payment became the property of the bride as a security in case of divorce. A portion of the payment was [illegible] set aside to cover the expenses of the wedding (p. 198). (3) From the end of the nineteenth century this modified form of bride purchase assumed a different meaning: the bride was no longer *sold* in the strict sense. Rather, [illegible] of the bride deserved to be compensated for the expenses involved [illegible] a child until it attained a marriageable age. It deserved to be com[illegible] for the loss of a valuable worker. With such motives in view the [illegible] the *kalym* as a form of *captatio benevolentiae* of the entire [illegible] the bride to the *kalym* was shared by all (p. 197). (4) Today the *kalym*

[1] [illegible] Organization, p. 44. See his excellent section on "Bride Wealth,"

[illegible] Caucasia, op. cit., p. 261.

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583 5(2) We do not wish to say that bride price in the strict sense of the word does not exist in Daghestan at all. The unfavourable position of the female sex in Botlikh is rightly attributed by Rossikov and Erdkert to the fact that she is still considered as purchased property, as chattel.[29] The *tol-pul* of the North Tabasaranians was anything but trivial.[30] In the "Adat Collection of the South Daghestanian Districts" we learn that it varied between Rs. 100 and Rs. 400, a maiden costing more than a widow.[31]

Even in localities where the *kalym* is so insignificant that it is actually only a symbol there are certain, and by no means trivial, expenses which must not be overlooked. First of all, there are not a few betrothal gifts (*infra*, pp. 102 f); then there are the relatively expensive marriage gifts, of which we shall speak below when describing the Lezghian wedding (*infra*, p. 119).

There is, moreover, the so-called *kebin*, a guarantee against divorce. Just [illegible] it is the bride who benefits from the *kebin*, it cannot be considered as a [illegible]. It is a security for the bride in case of divorce and is usually [illegible] by mutual agreement, depending, of course, on the economic and [illegible] of the contracting families. A widow of the *neden* class, for [illegible] more than a guarantee of Rs. 55.[32] In the province [illegible] Lak and Dargwa the *kebin* usually consists of a piece of land [illegible] Among the Kapuchians it consisted of [illegible] up to Rs. 40, while among the Tabasaranians up to Rs. 40. [illegible] do not fix a definite amount, leaving it entirely [illegible] In North Tabasaran the guarantee was usually [illegible] Rs. 3 to Rs. 25 for a widow.[33] The [illegible] sometimes and in Russian literature) [illegible] Mohammedanism.

[illegible] MOUNTAINEERS. [illegible] speaking of the Khevsurian [illegible] that the bride received no [illegible] Similarly, the Pshav would [illegible] satisfactory price for her.[34] It is [illegible] had to pay a higher [illegible] respectively.[35] The [illegible] the widow being older is more liable [illegible] than a young girl, and [illegible]

[illegible] ZKO XIII [illegible] R. Erdkert.

[illegible] SSKG VIII [illegible]

[illegible] ZKO II (1851) p. 84. For [illegible]

[illegible] Sbornik II, p. [illegible]

[illegible] Adat Lakho-Dargintsev i Ostalnykh," SSKG, VIII (1871), p. [illegible]

[illegible] O Tabasaro-Plemenakh Dagestana," ZKO III (1851), p. [illegible]

[illegible] ibid.

[illegible] Haxthausen, "Kadi, [illegible] Daghestan," SMOMPK, XXXI (1902), p. 80.

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for the family accruing from such a purchase. And as anywhere else in the world, only *good* brides were bought. The fact that a girl was purchased was a kind of flattery and even a definite proof of her good standing. The "price-tag" remained attached to her for the rest of her life, and in it she could find sufficient food for her vanity and self-complacency. 583 [584]

Kebin occupies a middle position between an actual bride-price and a dowry. Like a dowry it aims at being a security for the bride's future, and like the dowry it is given to the *bride* and not to her family. On the other hand, it resembles the bride-price in as much as it is paid by the *groom's* family, it is accompanied with much bargaining, and, finally, the amount is determined according to the same standards as the bride-price.

We have said above that through the influence of Russian and Islamic law bride purchase has become more and more like a guarantee against divorce or security in case of widowhood. However, we did not wish to say that before the coming of Islamism or of the Russians there was no economic security given to the bride. A less developed and relatively small dowry or *kebin* could have existed in the Caucasus long before Islamic *mahr* "received full approbation from Allah." We know that, independently of Islamism, the position of the female sex was greatly improved by a dowry, e. g., among the Japanese, Chinese, Ancient Germans, Kelts, and Babylonians. The Romans and the Greeks regarded a marriage without a dowry practically as concubinage.[58] If it could exist among these peoples independently of Mohammed, it could have existed in the Caucasus independently of Islamism as well. In fact we find a kind of dowry in North Caucasus in the practical wedding gifts given to the bride by her family.[59] Of course, a large dowry is out of place in such a strongly exogamous society as we find in the greater part of North Caucasia, for the family property must remain within the family. On the other hand, from our description of the wedding customs we shall be able to observe the relatively important rôle these gifts play in the endogamous part of North Caucasus.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that bride purchase in the strict sense of the word fits into the Caucasian economic form of life quite well. Though bride wealth is found equally in mother-right and father-right societies, bride purchase in the strict sense is an institution found almost exclusively in pastoral societies or in societies that have been greatly influenced by pastoral peoples, or that have passed through pastoral stages, such as we find in Africa, Asia, and Europe. We do not find the bride-*price* in Australia, Melanesia, Polynesia or in America.[60] [171]

§ 2. BY CAPTURE

"Bride capture" is just as much a blanket term as "bride purchase." Here too we must distinguish between genuine bride capture and various forms

[58] Schmidt-Koppers, *Völker und Kulturen*, p. 310

[59] Amiroov, "Sred. gorcev severnago Dagestana," SSKG, VII (1873), p. 50 f.

[60] R. Briffault, *op. cit.*, II, p. 218. Westermarck, *History of Marriage*, II (1925), pp. 278 ff.

dissolutions of the marriage bond, the husband forfeits the *kalym*, while the 586
wife, on her part, must return it to the man she unjustifiably abandons.[12] On the other hand, if the husband has sufficient grounds for a divorce, the *kalym* must be refunded; or if she justly abandons her husband, she need not return it. Legal grounds for a woman are impotency of the man for over a year and cruelty,[13] whereas a man (at least among the Temirgoi) may divorce his wife for disrespectfulness toward her parents- oder brothers-in-law or laziness.[14]

The wife never has a right to any special alimony. In case of divorce, she may take her personal property along, that is, personal gifts, and if the divorce was not justifiable, her *kalym*. She never receives additional support, except if she has a child less than a year old, in which case she is given, in addition, 10 *puds* of flour, 10 *puds* of millet, and not more than two sheep.[15]

The children always remain with the father. If one of the children is less than a year old, the mother may keep the child and nurse it till its second year, when it must, without delay, be returned to its father's family.[16] Since divorce is relatively frequent, in some Cherkess families we find children of two, three, or even more, different mothers.[17]

A Cherkess and Abkhazian divorcée is free to re-marry, provided the [587]
regulation regarding the *kalym* has been carried out.[18]

If the partners wish to reunite after a divorce, they can do so only if a marriage with another person and a subsequent divorce intervened. The intermediate marriage and divorce may have taken place only an hour before the re-union, it matters little. They are nevertheless indispensable. Of course, the "re-union" is more than a mere re-union; it is actually a second marriage between the same partners.[19] This practice evidently is of Islamic origin.

The NORTHEASTERN CAUCASIANS. The divorce regulations of the [177]
Chechens are much the same as those of the Abkhaz and Cherkess, but, owing to their greater isolation and slower acculturation, the divorce rights of the female partner have not reached the advantageous level of the Northwesterners.

In pre-Soviet times, a husband had far greater rights to dismiss his wife 586
than a wife had to abandon her husband., A husband might validly divorce 837
his wife at will, but his wife was not allowed to abandon her husband without first having received his consent.[20] Or again, as another *adat* has it: the infidelity of a wife is considered sufficient grounds for dismissal, but the infidelity

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[12] *ibid.*

[13] *ibid.*

[14] Vasil'kov, *l. c.*

[15] Ladyženskij, FT, p. 203.

[16] *ibid.*

[17] Vasil'kov, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

[18] Byhan, *La civilisation caucasienne*, p. 155.

[19] Ladyženskij, *op. cit.*, p. 199. This is a typically Islamic custom, cf. Koran, ii, 230. Cf. Juynboll, *op. cit.*, pp. 229—232; also, A. Gren, "Kratkoe izloženie Šariata," *Terskij Sbornik*, III (1892), No. 2, Part 2, p. 16.

[20] Leontovič, II, p. 170, § 123; p. 175, § 160. "§ 123 . . . žena na razvod prava ne imĕet, bez soglasija muža Mužu že dozvoljaetsja razvod vo vsjakoe vremja, ne sprasivaja soglasija ženy."

[S.c.-Analyst]

9: Lužbetak E-4 (no date) 1951 RH1 Caucasia RH1

The *khatun-tallkh* is a much stronger oath than any other in Daghestan, even 586
stronger than an oath on the Koran. The wife, therefore, may be the innocent 695
victim of her husband's falsehood.

The *khatun-tallkh*, according to Robertson-Smith (*Kinship in Early Arabia*, [77]
p. 77) and Kohler ("Ueber das vorislamitische Recht der Araber," *Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtsw.*, VIII [1888], pp. 246, 251) is a pre-Islamic oath incorporated into Islamic law. Kovalevskij, who cites both authors, maintains that Islamic missionaries are responsible for the practice in Daghestan.[30] We cannot deny the possibility of Islamic origin, but mere similarity is no sufficient proof. If such argumentation were methodologically indisputable, we should be justified in concluding that the levirate, polygyny, divorce, and other institutions have been imported from Arabia. All that we wish to say is that it is not at all so certain that the Caucasian *khatun-tallkh* is of Islamic origin, as Kovalevskij would have us believe. An oath, by its very nature, seeks the strongest sanction possible. Now, we have shown, when treating of the attitude of the Caucasians toward plurality of wives, how highly a wife is esteemed. She is, we said, the best family investment. To be forced to surrender her would therefore be a very efficient sanction against perjury. It may very well be the high esteem for the value of a wife and the need of a strong sanction that gave rise to the *khatun-tallkh* long before Islamism appeared on Caucasian soil, and perhaps belongs to a common substratum of ancient Arabian culture and Caucasian customary law.

Although the question regarding the guardianship of children after divorce 586
has not been studied, we may conjecture that Lesghian *adats* restrict the right [428]
to the father alone. Guardianship, as a general rule, in primitive societies, follows the norms of inheritance: in patrilineal families the children remain with the father, in matrilineal, with their divorced mother. Since inheritance is fundamentally patrilineal according to ancient customary law of the Lesghians, we feel justified in making this hypothetical assumption.[31]

The women of the neighbouring peoples enjoy about the same rights of divorce as do the North Caucasian women. Everywhere they are at a disadvantage.

SOUTHERN CAUCASIANS. Eristov tells us that during his time the Georgian mountain tribes would divorce their wives for the least provocation. It happened now and then that a week after marriage the bride would not turn out to be as pleasing as the groom had imagined, or as good a housekeeper as the groom's family hoped for; such a disappointment was sufficient to occasion a divorce.[32] She could also be dismissed for superficiality, theft, or laziness.[33]

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[30] Kovalevskij, *Zakon*, II, p. 127.

[31] Cf. Abercromby, *op. cit.*, p. 97, who believes that the Avars do not have a fixed rule in this regard.

[32] Eristov, *op. cit.*, pp. 112 f.

[33] Seidlitz, "Gemeinde- und Familienleben der Chewsuren," Das Ausland, 1891, No. 17, p. 336. If the woman had a son, it was much more difficult to divorce her (a custom of the Pshavs), cf. Makalatija, "Iz starogo narodnago byta Pšavov," p. 109.

S: Lužbetak E-4 (no date) 1951 RHl Caucasia RHl

174 was the procreation of children, but especially of sons, who would one day become the performers of the sacred rites connected with ancestor worship. The cult for the departed was connected with the cult of the fireplace and was looked upon as the most sacred duty of the individual and of the family. Since the members of the same sib were descendents of the same ancestors, they were bound to one another in life and in death. This solidarity explains the frequency of family feuds, for blood-revenge was considered a very sacred duty. Polygyny was relatively common; polyandry, however, was taboo. The proof of virginity, the levirate, and the regulations regarding divorce and many other matters are very similar to those still in practice among the Ossetes of the Caucasus. It is also worthy of note that the Ossetine *adats* differ but slightly from the customary laws of their ancestors, while, as we have observed throughout the present study, the North Caucasians, especially the Cherkess, the Abkhaz, and the Ingushi differ but little from their neighbours, the Ossetes.[10]

[117] The contact with the Indo-Europeans, especially with the Ossetes and their ancestors, must have been very important. We need but think of the powerful Scythians and then, later on, of the Alans who made their presence felt as far east as China and as far west as Spain. Many of the customs, especially of the Cherkess, Abkhaz and Ingushi, have certainly been borrowed from the Ossetes; the many legends about ancient heroes, especially the so-called Nart-stories, and a deities now worshipped by the North Caucasian are certainly of Iranian origin.

[118] If we now compare the Turco-Mongolian society with that of the North Caucasian Indo-Europeans we shall find a striking similarity in many features in the three groups.[11] To point out a few of the more

[10] Among the Indo-European tribes might be mentioned child-marriages, the [illegible] of the price to keep [illegible], the custom of veiling and covering [illegible] etc. See especially F. Hermann, "Die Eheformen [illegible] Göttingen, pp. 39—62. [illegible] the ancient Indo-European family on: Koppers, *op. cit.*, [illegible] O. Schrader, *op. cit.*, [illegible] F. Hermann, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

[11] [illegible] that continued to the tenth century. [illegible] privilege of the rich. The impediment of consanguinity [illegible] insisted upon. Girls would be married off against [illegible] among the ancient Slavs. A wife was acquired [illegible] between a clan family (*rodovaia* or *bolšaia* [illegible] *malaia*) [illegible] was made with a patriarch (*starosta*) [illegible] to note that the same concept of a household [illegible] Blood feuds, bloodwite, the [illegible] and many other features of [illegible] society. Ancestor worship centred [illegible] family was the family priest. Vestiges [illegible] F. Engels, *Russian Origin and Social Development* [illegible] pp. [illegible] also on the Slavic family organization see [illegible] *Grundriss der slavischen Altertumer*. [illegible] are still found among the Armenians, Persians, Kurds, etc.

See Schrader, *op. cit.*, pp. [illegible]—[illegible]. As W. Schmidt pointed out [illegible] *Volker and Kulturen*, [illegible] of the pastoral nomadic civilization [illegible] among the Hamito-Semitic peoples [illegible]

8: Lužbetak E-4 (no date) 1951 RH1 Caucasia RH1

Marriage and the Family of the Caucasians in the Light of Anthropology 199

essential parallels—characteristic of the Turco-Mongolian family are: the 174
almost complete absence of mother-right and totemistic practices, the emphasis
placed on the joint family and the male members, special rights for the first-
born son, importance of the male head of the family and the *patria potestas*, 51
the disadvantageous position of the female sex, blood-feuds, exogamy, the
kalym, which is usually paid in live-stock, the dread of incest, the severe penalties
for sexual offenses, fireplace ceremony at weddings, the high esteem for the
bride's virginity, the unusual craving for male children, the importance of the
virgal processes, etc.

There is also a religious connection between the North Caucasians, the [177]
Indo-Europeans, and the Turco-Mongols, a connection that confirms our claim
of the existence of a social connection between the three groups. It is not only
the similarity of the religions of the three groups that we must keep in mind
but also the intimate connection, the *organic* connection, between the nomadic
social and religious forms. The solidarity which exists among the members of [769]
a son, the great longing for male children, blood-feuds, the levirate, the *patria*
potestas, the wedding custom of walking around the fireplace, and many other
practices are fundamentally connected with ancestor worship and cult for the
dead. Ancestor worship is one of the essential features of the religion of the
Indo-Europeans, the Turco-Mongols, and the North Caucasians. Moreover, [752]
among all three groups ancestor worship is linked up with the worship of the
fireplace. Another very essential part of the pastoral nomadic religion was the
custom of sacrificing horses. W. Koppers has shown the great similarity between
the horse sacrifices in the Indo-European and Altai peoples;[47] R. Bleichsteiner [71]
proved beyond question the existence of the practice throughout the highlands
of Caucasia.[48] Horse sacrifices among the Indo-Europeans and the North Cau-
casians are certainly of Inner Asiatic origin.

Thus we see that even though the North Caucasians are not pastoral
nomadic in the economic sense—the economy of the steppes is impossible in
the mountains, especially in the unfertile valleys of the Caucasus—they are
pastoral nomadic in their social organization. *A connection between the North
Caucasian society and that of Inner Asia is beyond question.*

3. Vestiges of More Ancient Cultures In the Marriage and Family Customary Laws of the North Caucasians

As is only natural, the deeper we delve into the history of the marriage 611
and family *adats* the more obscure the history becomes. 562

First of all there are the so-called mother-right vestiges which we must
consider. It is interesting to note that the intensity of these vestiges among the
three different groups of Caucasians (Northwestern, Northeastern, and Southern)

[47] W. Koppers, *op. cit.*, pp. 121, 18—22. See also W. Koppers, "Pferdeopfer und Pferdekult der Indogermanen," *Wiener Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte und Linguistik*, IV (1936), pp. 280—411.

[48] "Rossweihe und Pferderennen im Totenkult der kaukasischen Völker," *Wiener Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte und Linguistik*, IV (1936), pp. 412—495.

Ca 771 [870] during the summer holidays all that the Soviet authorities wished them to disregard. A number of Ingush party and Communist Youth League members, instead of working against the influence of religion, used themselves to go to the mosques to pray.[7]

Ca 647 191 The difficulties existing between the Soviet authorities and the Chechens and Ingush[1] were not exclusively due to the Bolshevik failure to understand the importance of the religious factor in the life of the mountaineers. There were also extraordinary difficulties of a technical nature, due to the fact that the directives of the central administration were issued in the Russian language and therefore did not reach the Chechen-Ingush masses. Being unable fully to understand the orders received, the local Soviet organs either could not carry them out, or falsified the decisions of the party and of the administration.[8]

GROZNY – THE OIL CITY

Ca 178 It was the tremendous dead weight of the predominantly Russian capital of Chechenia that prevented the implementation of any genuine Chechen autonomy and finally spelled the doom of the Chechen people. The actual liquidation of the Chechens would probably not have occurred had not the largest town in their homeland become an oil city, and indeed, one of the most important oil centres of the U.S.S.R.

Ca 915 SU 315 This oil city had developed out of the little fortress of Grozny[2]. Although Grozny oilfields had been discovered as early as 1833, they were hardly exploited at all in the nineteenth century. In 1912, however, they already supplied 11·5 per cent of the entire Russian oil. Between 1913 and 1917 this figure had risen to 16·7 per cent, and in the following four years to nearly 25 per cent. By 1937 the proportion of Grozny oil to total Russian oil production had fallen to 9·25 per cent, but in terms of absolute figures this output represented an increase of 234 per cent, compared to that before the First World War. The development of Ca 361 162 Grozny as an oil centre made for an increase of the population on an 'American scale'. In 1890 the place had no more than 6,000 inhabitants, against 34,067 in 1913, 97,095 in 1926 and 172,468 in 1939. It need hardly be added that the Chechens and Ingush, peoples consisting of shepherds and peasants, could not contribute anything worth mentioning to the rise of the town which was styled, almost ironically, 'Capital of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R.'. Among the oilworkers of Grozny there were probably at no time more than one-tenth of 'natives', and until 1936 there were but 9·7 per cent.

Ca 177 SU 563 Unlike so many cities in the Soviet Union, Grozny never changed its name under the Soviet régime, despite the imperialistic history connected with it. As a matter of fact, it was the Soviet oil city of Grozny which spelled the doom of the Chechens and not the little fortress which

1 [Cf. category 116, pp. 186-188, R1 Sov. Union; 21: Kolarz - Analyst]
2 [Cf. category 116, p. 186, R1 Sov. Union; 21: Kolarz Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

[Chechen-Ingush] RH1

Yermolov had founded to spread terror among the mountaineers. The struggle which Czarist Russian officers had begun was terminated by Soviet Russian police officials, who finally ensured Russian domination over the northern slopes of the Northern Caucasus by expelling the Chechens bag and baggage. It is questionable whether the crimes officially attributed to the Chechens – particularly the help which they had given to the Germans – would have been a sufficiently weighty reason for exterminating them as an organized community, had not the Grozny oil been involved. To protect the Grozny oil-wells against all future risks the Soviet authorities removed the Chechens from Grozny's hinterland and transformed the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. into the Grozny Province.[1] Grozny is another instance of the danger which the existence of oil-wells can bring to a small people. Whether in Latin-America, the Middle East or in the Soviet Union, national self-determination, independence, autonomy and national rights count little as soon as oil interests are at stake.

Almost up to the very moment of their suppression as an ethnographic unit,[2] Russian propaganda made considerable use of the Chechens in its attempt to impress the public abroad with the Soviet nationalities policy. Even a year after the outbreak of the Second World War the Chechens were still regarded as a 'good people'. In August 1942 they were said to have played a prominent part in a 'big anti-fascist meeting' in the town of Ordzhonikidze where 3,000 mountaineers pledged their 'boundless devotion to our beloved motherland – the Soviet Union – and the great Russian people'. Delegates of the Chechens, Ingush, Balkars – all peoples whom the Soviet Government later deprived of their national existence – addressed the meeting and spoke about their strong friendship towards the Russians.[9] Data made available on October 5th, 1942, showed that forty-four Chechens had been awarded decorations for valour in the field, not a bad record considering that far larger national units like the Turkmenians, Tadzhiks, Kirghiz and Estonians had not won many more by that date.

Paradoxically, the Chechens and Ingush continued to serve the purpose of Soviet propaganda even after their liquidation as political entities.[2] Their removal from their homeland enabled the Soviet régime to rewrite the entire history of the Northern Caucasus. This rewriting consisted in blaming the Chechens and Ingush for all acts of anti-Soviet resistance perpetrated in the years following the October Revolution in the Caucasus region, and in whitewashing all other nationalities. This new interpretation of Caucasus history was even elaborated in a statement of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party. It dealt with the opera *The Great Friendship* the libretto of which had not taken into account the official reorientation with regard to the history of the Caucasus. The Central Committee statement of February 10th,

[1] Cf. category 116, p. 185, R1 Sov. Union 21. K[illegible]

[2] [illegible] category [illegible] 37, pp. [illegible]

21; Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Caucasia RH1
[Osset]

territory comprising 1,200 square miles was a national triumph for Georgia, for it enabled her, for the first time, to spread out to the north of the Caucasus.

S.U. 563 634

A 'GOOD' PEOPLE – THE OSSETINS

After the expulsion of the Chechens from their homeland the Ossetins became the largest mountain people of the Northern Caucasus. In 1939 there were altogether 354,000 Ossetins in the U.S.S.R. of whom slightly less than two-thirds lived in the Autonomous Republic of Northern Ossetia, with which we are here primarily concerned, and about one-third in the Southern Ossetin Autonomous Province of Georgia. The two Ossetin territories adjoin each other and it would have been logical to amalgamate them into a single Autonomous Republic. Representatives of the two Ossetias went to Moscow in October 1925 to discuss the unification of their people with the Soviet central Government and personally with Stalin whose own mother is of Ossetin origin. This discussion which is briefly referred to in the seventh volume of Stalin's complete works, was inconclusive. The unification of the Ossetins would have been possible only at the expense of Georgia and the Kremlin was apparently not prepared to harm the interests of one of the constituent republics of the U.S.S.R. for the sake of a minor nationality.

Ca. 101 [162] 642 S.U. 563 631

Czarist and Bolshevik authorities agree in their appraisal of the comparatively peaceful and placid Ossetins, no less than in their judgment on the turbulent Chechens. Of course, both régimes had encountered difficulties among the Ossetins, too, but never on the same scale as in the case of other Caucasus mountain peoples.

Ca. 181

Czarist Russia started the conquest of the Ossetins in the period of Catherine II and skilfully exploited the class differences among them as well as their hostility toward their western neighbours – the Kabardinians. Many Ossetins considered the establishment of Russian rule as a safeguard against the danger of attacks by more warlike mountain peoples. Ossetin folk-songs of the early epoch of Russian conquest reflect a pro-Russian spirit and state unequivocally that living under Russian rule was identical to living in peace.

Ca. 175 177

The Ossetins appreciated that Russian occupation and protection enabled them to settle in the plain from which they had been driven by the Kabardinians. Part of that re-settlement had already started in the second half of the eighteenth century. The major part of the re-settlement action was, however, carried out much later, between the twenties and the forties of the nineteenth century.

The Ossetins were of use to Russia not only as settlers, but also as soldiers. As early as the last years of the eighteenth century a number of Ossetin officers distinguished themselves in Prince Potemkin's army in

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
[Osset] Caucasia RH1

Ca. 175 177

actions against the Turks. An Ossetin Major-General, K. Zankisov, fought in Poland against the insurgents of 1863–4 and he was by no means the only Ossetin Major-General of that epoch. Furthermore, an 'Ossetin Division' became famous in the course of the Russo-Turkish War in 1877–8, when General Skobelev described its 'chivalrous gallantry' as being 'above any praise'.[12]

Ca. 177 538

Russian cultural work among the Ossetins started much earlier than among other mountain peoples. The first book to appear in the Ossetin language was printed in Moscow in 1798; its object was to serve as a kind of introduction to the study of the Bible. A long period of fruitful association with the Russians and the general peaceful approach of the Ossetins towards Russian military and political rule made them more open to the acceptance of Russian preponderance. The Ossetins were, as a matter of fact, the only people of the Northern Caucasus to produce a great writer in the person of Kosta Khetagurov (1859-1906) who was half Russianized himself and wrote in both the Ossetin and Russian languages. The Soviet régime greatly popularized Khetagurov as a symbol of Russian-Ossetin synthesis, which he undoubtedly was. He had a complete Russian education, had studied at St. Petersburg and was strongly influenced by such progressive Russian writers as Herzen and Chernishevsky, which makes him particularly acceptable from the Soviet point of view.

Ca. 423 668 474 691

Until the Ossetins gave proof of their loyalty to Russia during the war the Soviet régime had had to overcome Ossetin resistance to both the establishment of collective farms and the suppression of tribal customs. During the period of the collectivization Ossetin peasants waged a sort of guerilla warfare against 'socialist property' and while outwardly accepting collectivization, tried to transform the Kolkhoz into an instrument of their respective clans. Ossetin chairmen of collective farms and officials of local Soviets seem to have acted on the principle 'I decide who is a kulak and an enemy of the State and who is not'. Thus, at least during its initial stage, collectivization in Ossetia became a downright farce. Persons belonging to a rival clan were rendered innocuous by being denounced as kulaks; real kulaks, on the other hand, were promoted to the rank of respectable Soviet citizens if they happened to belong to the clan dominating the local village council or the collective farm concerned.[13]

Ca. [725] 631 142 S.U 563 634

All such 'incidents' were forgotten when the Ossetins redeemed their reputation by their brilliant war record. In the fighting which resulted in the dislodgement of the Germans from the approaches to the Caucasus, Ossetin partisans operating from behind the enemy lines greatly assisted the Red Army.[14] As a mark of appreciation for their loyalty, the Soviet Government allowed the Ossetins to increase substantially the territory of their national republic. A decree of April 8th, 1944, stipulated

O 428 [589] [823 cont.]
relative of the deceased, who supports her if she is not married by her husband's father or brother, as was formerly their duty. Children born of this new marriage or born out of wedlock are regarded as children of the deceased and inherit his name and part of his estate, since the woman belongs to the husband's kin group.

b) Other Iranians, Indians, etc.

C 563 ● 171 Of the European peoples who have migrated in during the last century, only the Russians, as a ruling class, have exerted some influence on the spiritual life and the material possessions of the Caucasians; on the other hand, the Cossacks on the Kuban and Terek, as a result of friendly and hostile contact with the Cherkess, Abkhaz, and Tatars, have taken over much from them. [824] [Fig. 503 appears here.]

Of the Asiatic Indo-Germanic peoples, the Armenians (see Vol. II, 1, pp. 398 ff.) have played an essential role in the intellectual development of the plains Georgians (see p. 675 [untranslated]), and the physical relationship or admixture of the two, or to put it better, mixture of the native basic stock of the Near East with southern and eastern indigenous Caucasians, up to the Chechen in the northeast, appears visibly in many places (see pp. 31 f.).

As far as the Iranians are concerned, the Kurds (see Vol. II, 1, pp. 400 ff.) certainly came into contact with the Georgians relatively late and in any case have neither experienced any influence from them nor exerted any on them, or at most on their Gurian neighbors. The sect of the Yezid, who stand close to the Kurds in many respects, even with regard to their religious teachings, has settled in a few places in southernmost Caucasia (see Vol. II, 1, pp. 403 f.).

It is quite another matter with regard to the Persians (see Vol. II, 1, pp. 405 ff.), who, in part directly through trade or settlement, in part indirectly through Armenia, and later

[824 cont.]

443
291

Fig. 503. Persian fruit-seller in Baku.

563
[177] through the Tatars, have exerted a strong influence from the earliest times on southern and eastern Caucasia with regard to mental culture, art, warfare, etc. As a landmark of their power, the great stone wall, which extends from the national portal on the Caspian Sea, from the city [825] of Derbend
[103] (Persian = gate-lock, Tatar, Demír-kapú = iron door; Arabic, bāb-el-abwāb = gate of gates), to the west 60 to 70 kilometers into the mountains, still stands today. It was erected by the Sassanid king, Khosrau Anōšarvān (531-579 A.D.), for protection against the invasions of the Khazar and Alan, against whom his father, Kobad (491-531), had already built a wall
[112] of mud bricks that was strengthened by many towers and small citadels (kalé). Except for indigenous tribes, Khosrau entrusted the defense of the wall primarily to Iranian settlers whom he had brought over from Persia and the land of Sogd, that is Kharezmia and Samarkand. The inhabitants of the Kaitakh region, the Tabassaran, seem to be descendants of these settlers, and their name may be a contraction of Tabor-i-Khorassan (= host, people from Khorassan); likewise the Tāt between Baku, Kuba, and the Babadagh and near Derbend. The former may have sprung from a mixture of Lezgin with

177.80 ---177.95

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
[Kabardin] Caucasia RH 1

S.U 563 634 687

achieved a dual purpose. In addition to punishing the Balkars it served as a warning for the Kabardinians, who from then on hastened to express their loyalty towards Soviet Russia in a very demonstrative, even effusive, way.

Ca. 172.8/ 814 S.U. 563 814

After the war the Soviet authorities found it advisable to provide for the Kabardinians, as a means of strengthening their allegiance to the Soviet State, a clear conception of history which would unequivocally show that the Russians had always been the protectors of the Kabardinian people. The task of formulating the details of this conception was assigned to the 'Kabardinian Research Institute', whose headquarters are in Nalchik, the capital of the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. The new conception implied the 'official recognition' of Temryuk Idarovich as the national hero of Kabarda. Kabardinian children are expected to look up to Temryuk with the same awe as Russian boys and girls to Peter the Great or Suvorov. According to the new official thesis Temryuk, a Kabardinian prince who lived around 1550, 'endeavoured to build up a strong centralized State able to resist Turkish and Crimean Tartar oppressors'. Temryuk had realized that the Kabardinians were incapable of withstanding their enemies if they were to rely on their own forces only; establishment of close contacts with Muscovy was therefore the only wise Kabardinian policy.[15]

It is the same story which is told with some variation to all the peoples of the Soviet Union in all their many languages. There is always a grain of truth in the story, but never the entire truth, since history is not so simple and so clear-cut that it would fit the purposes of a one-sided propaganda. It is a historical fact that Temryuk asked Ivan the Terrible for protection and even gave him his daughter for wife. Originally, in the days of greater internationalism, Soviet historians failed to stress this fact, and laid more emphasis on the slave trade in which the Kabardinian feudal lords had engaged with the Crimean Tartar Khanate. However, since events had proved the necessity of increasing the attachment and loyalty of the Kabardinians to the Russians and the Soviet State, Temryuk had to be brought to the forefront of Kabardinian history.

Ca. 177.53 538

Kabardinian post-war literature also pursued the aim of re-educating the Kabardinian people. The central theme of the first Kabardinian literary almanac consisted in showing that it was 'the friendship with the Russian people that led the Kabardinians towards a better life.'[16]

While a great deal was done for 're-education' in the sense required by the Russians, education as such had been neglected during the first post-war years, at least as far as the Kabardinian language was concerned. The so-called 'national' schools in the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. were Kabardinian in the first four forms only; from the fifth form onwards teaching was in the Russian language exclusively. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party issued in 1948 a state-

8: Luabetak E-4 (no date) 1951 RHI Caucasia RHI

IV. CONCLUSION

Chapter XIV

Conclusion

§ 1. MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY OF THE CAUCASIANS IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORY

1. Russian (Soviet and Pre-Soviet) Influence

[illegible] the Russian military, political and cultural influence has greatly [illegible] the marriage and [illegible] customs of the various [illegible] Caucasian [illegible] deemed. We need not recall some of the many [illegible] comparative study.

[illegible] severely prosecute *polygyny* (*supra*, p. 39) [illegible] relative scarcity of polygamous unions throughout [illegible] regardless of how ethnically different [illegible] at least in part, to Russian legislation.

[illegible] have begun to enjoy greater *freedom of choice*, [illegible] Russian insistance on freedom in mating as a *con-* [illegible] valid marriage.

[illegible] how rapidly *bride purchase* was disappearing or [illegible] significance throughout the Caucasus, again, at least in part, [illegible] legislation, industrialization, and education (*supra*, pp. [illegible]).

(4) *Bride price*, *bloodwite*, etc. were formerly measured in cows, horses, sheep, and oxen, but nowadays are measured in money: not in live stock but in Russian rubles! (*Supra*, pp. 82—89, 95, 168—170).

(5) The Russian opposition to *bride capture* has helped to make the practice become rare (*supra*, pp. [illegible]). It was Russian positive law gaining ascendency over the *patria potestas* and its insistance on freedom of choice that encouraged and even defended elopement (*supra*, p. 98).

(6) The general disappearance of slavery and the associated sociological consequences, e. g., *the marriage impediments*,

(7) the *less severe penalties for sex crimes* which are gradually being adopted by all tribes of Caucasia (*supra*, pp. 175, 180).

(8) and the improvement in the *status of the female sex*, all must be reckoned among the effects of Russian and Soviet influence.

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IV. CONCLUSION

Chapter XIV

Conclusion

§ 1. MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY OF THE CAUCASIANS IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORY

1. Russian (Soviet and Pre-Soviet) Influence

[illegible] influence has greatly [illegible] of the various [illegible] many [illegible]

[illegible] unions the [illegible] ethnically different [illegible] Russian legislation [illegible] freedom of choice, [illegible] mating as a con- [illegible] [84]

[illegible] was disappearing or [illegible] Caucasus, again, at [illegible] trialization, and education [illegible] [583]

[illegible] were formerly measured in cows, horses, [illegible] measured in money, not in live stock but in Russian rubles [illegible] pp. 82–89, 95, 168–170).

[illegible] The [illegible] has helped to make the practice [illegible] It was Russian positive law gaining ascendency over the *patria potestas* [illegible] freedom of choice that encouraged and even defended elopement (*supra*, p. 98).

[illegible] The general disappearance of slavery and the associated sociological consequences, e. g., *the marriage impediment*.

[illegible] the *less severe penalties for sex crimes* which are gradually being adopted by all tribes of Caucasia (*supra*, pp. 175, 180).

[illegible] and the improvement in the *status of the female sex*, all must be reckoned among the effects of Russian and Soviet influence.

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p. 89

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Conclusion

Speaking of Russian influence, we must emphasize that nothing tends to [illegible] the marriage and family observances among the mountaineers as much as formal education, formal Russian, and especially Soviet education (*supra*, p. 147).

Russian influence and the consequent change in customary marriage and family law (and we may include changes in Islamic law) are most strongly felt near and in large Russian cities like Grozny, along the coast of the Black and Caspian Sea, and, in general, wherever industrialization is making great strides. It is more strongly felt in the lowlands, less in the highlands, and only slightly in isolated villages.

2. Islamic Influence

Going somewhat deeper into history, we find a second principle, changing and unifying the customary law of the various mountain peoples of Caucasia, Islamic law, known as the *šari'a*.

1. A number of *marriage impediments*, e. g., the "waiting period," the impediment of relationship by milk, etc. have either been introduced by Mohammedan missionaries or, at least, greatly modified by Islamic law (pp. 55, 66, 69).

2. We have observed in not a few instances a conflict between the native [illegible] and the *šari'a*, e. g., the struggle between *obligatory levirate* and Islamic [illegible] (*supra*, p. 73).

3. Non-virgins are sometimes given *freedom of choice* in mating (*supra*, [illegible]) [illegible] a practice in full accord with the teaching of the [illegible]

4. [illegible] Islamic influence, genuine *bride price* has throughout North [illegible] to become a form of dowry, called *kebin* (*supra*, p. 90).

[illegible] for *abduction* (*supra*, pp. 92—96).

[illegible] *separation of sexes* (*supra*, pp. 126 f., 166).

[illegible] customs, such as, naming of children, etc. (*supra*, pp. 142 f.,

[illegible] *engagement observances* (*supra*, pp. 100—110).

[illegible] law (*supra*, pp. 133—137).

[illegible] *relations* (*supra*, pp. 152—156);

[illegible] *relations* (*supra*, pp. 138—149, 187).

[illegible] *penal laws* for sexual offenses (*supra*, p. 171).

[illegible] (*supra*, p. [illegible]).

[illegible] general improvement in the *relative position of sexes*, e. g., [illegible] Kabardia and Ossetia,[1] the *kebin*, [illegible]

[illegible] Islamic law. The *šari'a* is doubtless one of [illegible] principles in the marriage and family laws of the Caucasians. [illegible] strength of this influence and the opposition against it have [illegible] everywhere. Islamism has had very little influence on the [illegible] the southern Caucasians, except, of course, in Sakataly

[1] [illegible] Bergvölker des Kaukasus," *Zeitschr.* [illegible]

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Historical Influences

Christian [illegible]

[illegible]

Georgia and [illegible]. It was [illegible], for example, that the laws of the [illegible]. Nevertheless, the influence on [illegible] marriage and family law has been only slight.

Armenian, Byzantine, and Roman Influences. There have been other [illegible] of the marriage and family [illegible] of the Caucasus [illegible] as Armenian, Byzantine, Roman influence etc., but

[1] Leontovič, II, p. 233, § 3.

[2] Leontovič, II, p. 233, § 4.

[3] Leontovič, II, p. 232, § 2.

[4] Kovalevsk, Zakon, I, pp. [illegible]. Cf. also Zacharias, *Prehistory*, p. 351.

[5] Ladyzhenski, op. cit., p. 243.

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77.58 [illegible] have been felt either exclusively among the Southern Caucasians or have not been very great. The Roman-Byzantine influence was passed on to the North Caucasian tribes mainly through the Armenians and Georgians, which, however, did not affect their customary laws to any appreciable extent. Kovalevskij had a tendency to overemphasize these influences; he believed, for example, that the practice of offering an engagement gift to the bride or her family was of Roman-Byzantine origin, and that the status of the Caucasian women had been greatly affected by Byzantine law.

§ 2. MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY OF THE CAUCASIANS IN THE LIGHT OF ANTHROPOLOGY

1. Analysis of Caucasian Adats: Predominant Character of North Caucasian Marriage and Family Customary Laws That of a Pastoral Nomadic Civilization

[illegible] historical influences and changes [illegible] the Caucasians we now arrive at a more or [illegible] marriage and family customary laws as a [illegible] pastoral nomadic" [illegible] pastoral nomads in the [illegible] the elements we shall [illegible] or example, adultery is [illegible] pastoral nomads), it is [illegible] entire institution [illegible] be noted that the [illegible] details therefore.

[illegible] was among the [illegible] has shown that all [illegible] through prolonged pastoral [illegible]

[illegible] pp. 83—122. [illegible] and was commonly found among [illegible] Europeans. Many of the components of [illegible] Whether the pastoral nomadic [illegible] the food-gathering stage, being the [illegible] the result of later [illegible] does not affect our

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174 [illegible] first nomads to establish themselves in the Caucasus, after having forced the [illegible] (c. 1200 B.C.) into the background. The Scythians were pre-[illegible] a pastoral people, while the tribes they subjected were agriculturalists. [illegible] new waves of Indo-Europeans, the Sarmatians, sweep over the [illegible] (c. 300 B.C. — A.D. 200) we see the Maeotes, Sindac, Sauro-[illegible] submitting to the newcomers.

175 [illegible] contact with the nomadic civilization continued up to our own times. [illegible] of the history of this region—in the first century B.C. Crimea [illegible] the shores of the Black and Azov Sea belonged to the Roman [illegible] this region that the Goths appeared. In the fourth century [illegible] the masters of the region north of the Caucasus. In the sixth [illegible] the Khazars, Avars, and the Bulgars appeared in North Caucasus; [illegible] seventh century we meet the Magyars there; in the eleventh century the [illegible] and in the thirteenth and fourteenth century the Mongols, driving [illegible] inhabitants of the Caucasus higher and higher into the mountains. In the [illegible] fifteenth century the Turks conquered Crimea, and the Georgian kings were [illegible] tributary to the Mongol.

[10] A glance at our ethnographical map of the Caucasus will suffice to convince [illegible] that the situation today is essentially the same: today the North Caucasians [illegible] very close contact with peoples who, originally if not any longer, pos-[illegible] nomadic [illegible] The Mountain Tartars (Balkarians) are [illegible] probably descendents of the Khazars or Volga-Bulgars. The Karakaitaghy [illegible] Mongols. The Nogai are descendents of the Golden Horde. [illegible] Asiatic nomads we find in the Caucasus such peoples [illegible]

[illegible] 58 [illegible] constant contact with nomadic societies perhaps from the very begin-[illegible] pastoral nomadism—certainly since the Scythian period almost 3000 [illegible] years—throws light upon the intricate problem: Why, how and when did the [illegible] marriage and family customary laws become so pastoral [illegible] contact, although not sufficient to *solve* the problem, can and [illegible] considerable light upon the *status* of the North Caucasians.

[illegible] not only the contact we must consider, but the actual similarity [illegible] organization. We shall therefore briefly describe the ancient [illegible] 54 [illegible] and then the common features of the Altai society. [illegible] show that the Caucasians have mixed (racially) [illegible] people coming from the North; [illegible] linguistics proclaims the same

[illegible]

[illegible] Beitrag zur [illegible] Anthro-[illegible]

[illegible] The Avars [illegible] Caucasians [illegible] Russians sometimes call them the [illegible]

[illegible] certain tribes have a strong Cau-[illegible] Groups have been actually Georgianized [illegible]

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§ 1. MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY OF THE CAUCASIANS IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORY

1. Russian (Soviet and Pre-Soviet) Influence

[illegible] influence has greatly [illegible] various [illegible] the many [illegible]

[illegible] of polygamous unions throughout [illegible] regardless of how ethnically different [illegible] part, to Russian legislation.

[illegible] enjoy greater *freedom of choice*, [illegible] freedom of mating [illegible] [584]

[illegible] *bride purchase* was disappearing or [illegible] throughout the Caucasus, again, at [illegible] [583]

[illegible] were formerly measured in cows, horses, [illegible] and oxen, [illegible] are measured in money, not in live-stock, but in Russian rubles [illegible] 168—170).

(4) The Russian opposition to *bride capture* has helped to make the practice [illegible] It was Russian positive law gaining ascendency over the *patria* [illegible] freedom of choice that encouraged and even defended elopement [illegible]

(5) The general disappearance of slavery and the associated sociological consequences, e. g., *the marriage impediments*,

(7) the *less severe penalties for sex crimes* which are gradually being adopted by all tribes of Caucasia (*supra*, pp. 175, 182).

(8) and the improvement in the *status of the female sex*, all must be reckoned among the effects of Russian and Soviet influence.

177.56
562
p. 139

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[18]. -1.1.1

Machabeli, who founded a daily paper. The style of this school was for the most part romantically patriotic, and it appealed primarily to the large and impoverished aristocratic class: but of all its disciples Ilia Chavchavadze alone had a following among the people. In general, the Russian Government had little to fear from the patriotic movement of the nobles: the majority of them served faithfully, some with distinction, in the Georgian regiments which played an important part in the Caucasian Campaign of 1877–8. Finally, the incorporation, in 1884, of the hitherto distinct Georgian army in the general military organisation of the Russian Empire marked the disappearance of the last remnant of the independence of the Georgian kingdom.

538 186 701 177.70

With the economic development of Transcaucasia the subversive social doctrines already spreading among the workmen of European Russia reached the Caucasus, and the Tiflis administration was confronted with a movement more real and more dangerous than the sentimental romanticism of the native princes. In 1870 European capital began to exploit Baku, and in the same year operations were begun at the great manganese deposits of Chiaturi. The construction of a railway line from Poti to Tiflis had been begun in 1867, and in 1883 this line was continued to Baku. In 1884 foreign capital, chiefly that of the Rothschilds, began to build a port at Batum. During the following thirty years the industrialisation of the Caucasus proceeded. Baku became one of the greatest petroleum centres of the world; further deposits of oil were exploited at Maikop and Grozni; another railway soon linked these towns with the Black Sea, the Caspian and Baku, and Russian, Armenian and foreign companies hastened to undertake the working of the rich manganese and copper deposits and the export of the silk, cotton, timber and wine of the country.

471 178 668

This sudden development soon produced the most complicated problems; antagonisms social and racial were precipitated in an acute form. The oil-towns were the foci of these antagonisms and the scene of the more sanguinary events of 1904–6, but the conditions there reacted on, and were reproduced in a lesser degree in, Georgia. Foreign capitalism was more than usually aggressive; as it believed itself to be operating in a new country where it was in a position to exploit cheap and inexhaustible supplies of uneducated native labour; and a sudden transition from feudalism to industrialism had created a labouring class the more dangerous because it could

177.66 668

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[1811-1917]

177.66 668 receive without assimilating all the latest doctrines of the semi-emancipated workers of Western Europe. And the great mass of casual labour—Gurians, Imeretians and Mingrelians—which flocked back to the villages every few months from the copper and manganese mines or the docks and oilcase factories at Batum, carried with them into the countryside the ill-comprehended doctrines of Marx and Engels which some agitator had muttered into their bucolic ears a few days before.

668 Thus it was not long before a branch of the Russian Social Democratic Party had been formed in Georgia, with local centres at Tiflis, Kutais, Poti and Batum. It was founded by Russians, but a number of able young Georgians were soon at its head. But they were journalists, artisans and lawyers who had replaced the former aristocrats of Chavchavadze's school as the leaders of Georgian opinion. Such were S. Gibladze, "the pioneer of Georgian Socialism," Ninishvili, "the Georgian Gorki," and G. Tsereteli, the founder of the Socialist paper *Krali*. The Social Democratic movement which professed to despise the Nationalist thought of Chavchavadze and based its theories on the class struggle, began to gain strength about the same time as the Imperial Government was initiating fresh anti-national measures, such as the forced emigration of the Ajars to Turkey (1880) and the enforcement of conscription in the Caucasus (1887). These measures doubtless drove many adherents into the Socialist ranks. In 1896 the railwaymen formed a first trade-union, [46] an example to be followed soon by the printers, iron-workers and other trades. In the same year Georgian Social Democracy received a brilliant recruit in Noah Jordania, who returned hot from the study of Marxism at Geneva to attack Ilia Chavchavadze in a series of articles in *Krali*. Agitation was now gathering force, and in 1900 Prince Galitsin's Military Law, imposing liability to service in the remoter parts of the Empire, provoked a series of ugly strikes, as a result of which Jordania was arrested, and *Krali* was suppressed, only to be revived by Irakli, son of Giorgi Tsereteli.

669 Towards the end of 1904 the revolutionary disturbances which had begun in European Russia spread to the Caucasus. The most blood-thirsty manifestations during the period 1904-6 took place at Baku and in the Armeno-Tatar regions, but the disaffection in Georgia was serious. In Tiflis bombs were thrown and officers were assassinated, while the Cossacks on more than one occasion inflicted cruel casualties on the crowd. Strikes took place along the Transcaucasian Railway,

[see cat. 116, pp 206-7 -- Analyst]

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§ 1. MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY OF THE CAUCASIANS IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORY

1. Russian (Soviet and Pre-Soviet) Influence

That the Russian military, [illegible] and cultural influence has greatly affected [illegible] the marriage and [illegible] of the various [illegible] be denied. We [illegible] some of the many [illegible] comparative study.

The [illegible] have seen severely prosecute *polygyny* (*supra*, p. 39) [illegible] The relat[illegible] scarcity of polygamous unions throughout North Caucasus [illegible] neighbourhood, regardless of how ethnically different [illegible] attributed, at least in part, to Russian legislation.

[illegible] have begun to enjoy greater *freedom of choice*, (*supra*, p. [illegible]) [illegible] the Russian insistance on freedom in mating as a *condition sine qua non* [illegible] valid marriage.

(3) We have [illegible] how rapidly *bride purchase* was disappearing or assuming an entirely different significance throughout the Caucasus, again, at least in part, owing to Russian legislation, industrialization, and education (*supra*, pp. 83, 87, 90).

(4) *Bride price, bloodwits*, etc. were formerly measured in cows, horses, sheep and oxen, but now they are measured in money: not in live stock but in Russian rubles! (*Supra*, pp. 82—89, 95, 168—170).

(5) The Russian opposition to *bride capture* has helped to make the practice become rare (*supra*, pp. [illegible]). It was Russian positive law gaining ascendency over the *patria potestas* and its insistance on freedom of choice that encouraged and even defended elopement (*supra*, p. 98).

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(7) the *less severe penalties for sex crimes* which are gradually being adopted by all tribes of Caucasia (*supra*, pp. 175, 180).

(8) and the improvement in the *status of the female sex*, all must be reckoned among the effects of Russian and Soviet influence.

5: Allen H-4 (no date) 1923 RH1 Caucasia RH2

[181.-1/1]

Machabeli, who founded a daily paper. The style of this school was for the most part romantically patriotic, and it appealed primarily to the large and impoverished aristocratic class; but of all its disciples Ilia Chavchavadze alone had a following among the people. In general, the Russian Government had little to fear from the patriotic movement of the nobles; the majority of them served faithfully, some with distinction, in the Georgian regiments which played an important part in the Caucasian Campaign of 1877–8. Finally, the incorporation, in 1884, of the hitherto distinct Georgian army in the general military organisation of the Russian Empire marked the disappearance of the last remnant of the independence of the Georgian kingdom. 538 186 701 177.70

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721 of the lowlands to the north and south. Spring and autumn were their favourite periods, and much ingenuity was exercised in spying out the land. Fighting was only resorted to in extreme cases; and on the whole we may look upon these raids as merely low-class robbery resorted to for the purpose of obtaining cattle, supplies and slaves, which were either absorbed by the raiders themselves or bartered with other tribes or merchants from other countries.

105 Some interesting descriptions of their daily life[1] in the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries are in existence. By these we learn that in the west their houses were all built of straw or wood. No towers or houses of stone existed, for that would show that the owner was in fear and did not know how to protect himself. They lived mostly on meat, millet, water and mead, and wore long silk or linen tunics with wide trousers tucked into long boots, the whole covered with a cloak of felt, and crowned by a conical cap. They wore long moustaches and shaved their heads, and their arrows, leather work and embroidery were of very fine execution. The eastern tribes, on the other hand, lived in stone fortified villages; their food consisted of barley bread, roots and a little meat, and their weapons included not only guns and spears but wooden shields as well. The Lesghians appear to have been much better off than most of the other tribes, but the Ossets and other Daghestanlis lived often in a condition of great poverty and hardship.

795 In the history of the religion of the various tribes can be traced the effects of the influence of neighbouring civilisations. 177.79 The primitive paganism of the tribes, tree, idol and animal worship, survived as a living force until the end of the eighteenth century. On the foundation of this paganism were grafted the various faiths of the different races, who successively invaded or traded with the mountain regions. The Persians introduced fire-worship; the early Georgian Kings propagated Christianity among the Abkhazians, Ossets and Lesghians. Even during the period of Arab hegemony in the Caucasus many districts were Christian which are now fanatically Muhammadan.

The Arabs were successful in converting large portions of Daghestan to Islam, and their influence survives, not only in religious practices but in the writing and the methods of gardening and irrigation used by the eastern tribes.[1]

During the Middle Ages Christianity was spread by the Bagratids among the Kabardians and Chechens, and in the

[1] Centre, iv, 218.

1 [i.e., of the caucasian mountain tribes--Analyst]

5: Allen H-4 (no date) 1923 RH1 Caucasia RH 1

Western Caucasus among the Cherkesses by Byzantine, Russian 795
and Latin influence. It was not until the sixteenth century, 177.79
when Turkish influence was strong in the Caucasus, and when the Russians were approaching from the north, that religion, as a political force, became a serious issue.

The relations between the Turks and the Cherkesses, Kabar- 648
[illegible] and Abkhazians were confined to the exchange of mer- 439
[illegible]dise for slaves and raw materials. Such relations were [illegible]ally beneficial, for while the Turks obtained from the Caucasus brave recruits for their Janissary Corps and beautiful wives for the Harems, the young men of the mountains grasped eagerly at the opportunity of a brilliant military career in foreign lands, and the young women forwent with little misgiving the [illegible] of the mountain huts for the lives of luxurious ease which lay beyond the slave-markets of Trebizond, Akhaltsikh or Constantinople. Militarily the Turks made no attempt to force their hegemony on the mountain tribes, while the latter for their part would have been quick to resent any [illegible] on their independence. If Islam spread among 177.95
the mountaineers, Cherkesses, Kabardans and Abkhazians, it 795
was rather the result of casual but continuous contact with Mussulman merchants and sailors than of any deliberate [illegible] of proselytisation on the part of the Turks. And it was [illegible] in the practice of which were mingled many old pagan superstitions and forgotten rites of Zoroastrian and [illegible] and which lay as lightly on the mountaineers as [illegible] during the period of Georgian influence. [illegible] on the propagation of the Muhammadan [illegible] the Kabardans during the latter half of the eighteenth century [illegible] that "the Port had endeavoured to [illegible] the religion of Mohammed by means of ecclesiastical [illegible]. The [illegible] Kabardans' *mullahs* or priests are [illegible] the pupils of [illegible] who go to the Tatars [illegible] Ender, where they learn to read and write [illegible] title of *Effendi*, and return to their native [illegible] the people in the Mohammedan faith, and [illegible] more and more from the connection with [illegible]

In Dag[illegible] Islam had been maintained and consolidated, [illegible] years of [illegible] Arabs, by constant contact with the Persians [illegible]. The Daghestanis were for the most part Sunni [illegible] at times, vented their fanaticism on the [illegible] townsmen of Derbent and Shemakha.

[illegible] Klaproth, p. 317.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
[Kabardin] Caucasia RH 1

S.U. 563 634 687

achieved a dual purpose. In addition to punishing the Balkars it served as a warning for the Kabardinians, who from then on hastened to express their loyalty towards Soviet Russia in a very demonstrative, even effusive, way.

Ca. 177.81 814 S.U. 563 814

After the war the Soviet authorities found it advisable to provide for the Kabardinians, as a means of strengthening their allegiance to the Soviet State, a clear conception of history which would unequivocally show that the Russians had always been the protectors of the Kabardinian people. The task of formulating the details of this conception was assigned to the 'Kabardinian Research Institute', whose headquarters are in Nalchik, the capital of the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. The new conception implied the 'official recognition' of Temryuk Idarovich as the national hero of Kabarda. Kabardinian children are expected to look up to Temryuk with the same awe as Russian boys and girls to Peter the Great or Suvorov. According to the new official thesis Temryuk, a Kabardinian prince who lived around 1550, 'endeavoured to build up a strong centralized State able to resist Turkish and Crimean Tartar oppressors'. Temryuk had realized that the Kabardinians were incapable of withstanding their enemies if they were to rely on their own forces only; establishment of close contacts with Muscovy was therefore the only wise Kabardinian policy.[15]

It is the same story which is told with some variation to all the peoples of the Soviet Union in all their many languages. There is always a grain of truth in the story, but never the entire truth, since history is not so simple and so clear-cut that it would fit the purposes of a one-sided propaganda. It is a historical fact that Temryuk asked Ivan the Terrible for protection and even gave him his daughter for wife. Originally, in the days of greater internationalism, Soviet historians failed to stress this fact, and laid more emphasis on the slave trade in which the Kabardinian feudal lords had engaged with the Crimean Tartar Khanate. However, since events had proved the necessity of increasing the attachment and loyalty of the Kabardinians to the Russians and the Soviet State, Temryuk had to be brought to the forefront of Kabardinian history.

Ca. 77.53 538

Kabardinian post-war literature also pursued the aim of re-educating the Kabardinian people. The central theme of the first Kabardinian literary almanac consisted in showing that it was 'the friendship with the Russian people that led the Kabardinians towards a better life.'[16]

While a great deal was done for 're-education' in the sense required by the Russians, education as such had been neglected during the first post-war years, at least as far as the Kabardinian language was concerned. The so-called 'national' schools in the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. were Kabardinian in the first four forms only; from the fifth form onwards teaching was in the Russian language exclusively. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party issued in 1948 a state-

8: Lužbetak E-4 (no date) 1951 RH1 Caucasia RH1

Conclusion

87 Speaking of Russian influence, we must emphasize that nothing tends to [illegible] the marriage and family observances among the mountaineers as much as formal education, formal Russian, and especially Soviet education (*supra*, [illegible]).

Russian influence and the consequent change in customary marriage and family law (and we may include changes in Islamic law) are most strongly felt near and in large Russian cities like Grozny, along the coast of the Black and Caspian Sea, and, in general, wherever industrialization is making great strides. It is more strongly felt in the lowlands, less in the highlands, and only slightly in isolated villages.

2. Islamic Influence

Going somewhat deeper into history, we find a second principle, changing and unifying the customary law of the various mountain peoples of Caucasia, Islamic law, known as the *šarī'a*.

A number of *marriage impediments*, e.g., the "waiting period," the impediment of relationship by milk, etc. have either been introduced by Mohammedan missionaries or, at least, greatly modified by Islamic law (pp. 55, 66, 69).

We have observed in not a few instances a conflict between the native [illegible] and the *šarī'a*, e.g., the struggle between *obligatory levirate* and Islamic [illegible] (*supra*, p. 73).

[illegible] are sometimes given *freedom of choice* in mating (*supra*, [illegible]) [illegible] practice in full accord with the teaching of the [illegible]

[illegible] Islamic influence, genuine *bride price* has throughout North [illegible] become a form of dowry, called *kebin* (*supra*, p. 90).

[illegible] for *abduction* (*supra*, pp. 92—96).

[illegible] *separation of sexes* (*supra*, pp. 106 f. 166).

[illegible] such as, naming of children, etc. (*supra*, pp. 142 f.).

[illegible] *observances* (*supra*, pp. 100—110).

[illegible] (*supra*, pp. 133—137).

[illegible] *relations* (*supra*, pp. 152—156).

[illegible] (*supra*, pp. 138—149, 187).

[illegible] the sexual offenses (*supra*, p. 171).

[illegible] (*supra*, p. [illegible]).

[illegible] the general improvement in the *relative position of sexes*, e.g., [illegible] rights in Kabardia and Ossetia,[1] the *kebin*, [illegible] others—

[illegible] Islamic law. The *šarī'a* is doubtless one of [illegible] principles in the marriage and family laws of the Caucasians. [illegible] the strength of this influence and the opposition against it have [illegible] everywhere. Islamism has had very little influence on the [illegible] Southern Caucasians, except, of course, in Sakataly

[illegible] der Bergvölker des Kaukasus," *Zeitsch.* [illegible]

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Western Caucasus among the Cherkesses by Byzantine, Russian 795
and Latin influence. It was not until the sixteenth century, 177.79
when Turkish influence was strong in the Caucasus, and when the Russians were approaching from the north, that religion, as a political force, became a serious issue.

The relations between the Turks and the Cherkesses, Kabar- 648
[illegible] and Abkhazians were confined to the exchange of mer- 439
[illegible]dise for slaves and raw materials. Such relations were [illegible]tually beneficial, for while the Turks obtained from the Caucasus brave recruits for their Janissary Corps and beautiful [illegible] for their harims, the young men of the mountains grasped [illegible] at the opportunity of a brilliant military career in foreign [illegible], and the young women forwent with little misgiving the hard domesticity of the mountain huts for the lives of luxurious [illegible] the slave-markets of Trebizond, Akhalt-[illegible] Constantinople. Militarily the Turks made no attempt to force their hegemony on the mountain tribes, while the latter for their part would have been quick to resent any [illegible] on their independence. If Islam spread among 177.95
the mountaineers, Cherkesses, Kabardans and Abkhazians, it 795
was rather the result of casual but continuous contact with [illegible] Mussulman merchants and sailors than of any deliberate [illegible] of proselytisation on the part of the Turks. And it was [illegible] in the [illegible] of which were mingled many old [illegible] superstitions and forgotten rites of Zoroastrian and [illegible] and which lay as lightly on the mountaineers as [illegible] Christianity during the period of Bagratid influence. [illegible] commenting on the propagation of the Muhammadan [illegible] the Kabardans during the latter half of the eighteenth century, remarks that "the Poles had endeavoured to [illegible] the religion of Mohammed by means of ecclesiastical [illegible]. Their [the Kabardans'] *mullahs* or priests are [illegible] of the princes or *mollas* who go to the Tatars [illegible] Ender, where they learn to read and write [illegible] title of *Effendi*, and return to their native country to [illegible] the people in the Mohammedan faith, and to detach [illegible] more and more from the connection with Russia.

[illegible] Daghestan Islam had been maintained and consolidated, [illegible] days of [illegible], by constant contact with the Persian [illegible] Shirvan. The Daghestanli were for the [illegible] at times, vented their fanaticism on the [illegible] of Derbend and Shemakha.

[illegible] Klaproth, p. 317.